This is an extended version of the article that first appeared in Socialist Lawyer #93. Giving an overview of the the first tranche of the Undercover Policing Inquiry, the article sets out submissions made to the inquiry by our comrades from the Public Interest Law Centre.
Spycops: when the public is the enemy
For more than four decades, the Metropolitan Police (MPS), the Security Services, the Government, and the British state maintained a veil of silence regarding political policing. They colluded and conspired together to conceal from public scrutiny the illicit and fundamentally undemocratic system of state-sponsored surveillance carried out by British police officers. The endorsement of political policing extended to the highest echelons of Government, perpetuating a culture of secrecy and unaccountability.
The discovery of this level of political policing owes itself to the courageous women – mainly grouped in the organisation Spies Out of Lives - who were deceived into engaging in intimate relationships with undercover officers (UCO’s). Their unwavering determination and advocacy compelled Theresa May to announce a public inquiry in 2015, which has begun to lift the veil of secrecy and expose these covert operations. Shamefully, UCO’s infiltrated campaigns advocating for family justice, a grievous violation of trust and privacy. To compound the scandal, UCO’s were deployed to spy on the Stephen Lawrence Family Campaign, exacerbating the sense of betrayal and injustice.
The Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) concluded Tranche 1 (covering 1968-1982) on 22nd February 2023. It has set a target to finalise and complete its investigations by 2026. So far the disclosure, accompanying the live testimony from non-state Core Participants (CPs), UCO’s and police managers has begun to expose a colossal scandal of unprecedented magnitude. The Inquiry Chair released an Interim Report based on the findings from Tranche 1 on the 29th June 2023. As we outline below there are some positive conclusions in this Interim Report, however, there are some problems with the Chair’s conclusions, and there are stark omissions.
In Tranche 1 of the Inquiry alongside my colleagues Piers Marquis of Doughty Street Chambers, and James Scobie KC of Garden Court Chambers, I represented three of Core Participants. Lindsey German was a former leading member of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and a founder of the Stop the War Coalition (StWC). ‘Mary’ was a member of the International Marxist Group (IMG) and a supporter of workers’ rights. She was deceived into a sexual relationship by a UCO. Finally we represent Richard Chessum who was an activist in the Troops Out Movement (TOM).
Tranche 1 structure
Tranche 1 of the UCPI covers the years 1968 to 1982. Due to the impact of Covid-19 the Tranche was split into parts.
The first part involved all parties providing an Opening Statement. The second part Tranche 1 covered the early stages of the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS), its establishment and initial work. The third part of Tranche 1 looked at the development of the work of the SDS. The fourth part of Tranche 1 was an examination of the role of MPS managers. All legal teams representing state participants (police, Home Office) and non state layers provided closing statements.
Political Policing and the Special Demonstration Squad
In our submissions to the Inquiry we argued that the Metropolitan Police established the Special Demonstration Squad in July 1968 as a direct response to the growing anti-war movement in Britain concerning the war in Vietnam. In that same year, the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC) organised two significant demonstrations in March and October. There is no doubt that the first demonstration caused alarm amongst leading police officers, senior civil servants and those in the Cabinet.
The disclosed documents from the Inquiry, show that UCO’s were deployed to attend VSC meetings. Their role involved attending, then discreetly observing from the back, taking notes, and relaying information to their MPS managers. The monitoring of the VSC continued as it prepared for the subsequent major anti-war demonstration in October 1968.
However, as our submissions illustrate the Security Services were taking an interest in the work of the SDS as early as August 1968. A document dated 2 August 1968 reveals that they already had an interest in the political policing. Meetings were subsequently held between MI5 and the MPS to discuss "arrangements to cover the demonstration in Grosvenor Square on 27th October." From this point and throughout the 1970s, MI5 increasingly assigned tasks for the SDS, tasks relating to infiltrating campaigning organisations and hoovering up information. Regular meetings were held between police managers and MI5, enabling the latter to begin to dictate the deployment of undercover officers and specify who they should target.
The disclosure provided were important insights. The SDS, initially modest in size, expanded its influence and obtained funding from the Home Office during Harold Wilson's Labour government. By the early 1970s, the SDS adopted a strategy of deep undercover operations, aiming to gather extensive information. Infiltration of organisations lasted up to four to five years. UCO’s assumed the identities of deceased children to establish fabricated backgrounds and cover stories. The SDS's annual reports provide clear details of the expenses incurred by UCO’s for accommodation and vehicles, with government approval granted on a yearly basis. Between 1968 and 2008, the SDS successfully infiltrated and monitored over 1,000 groups, including political parties, anti-racist organisations, and peace groups.
Our submissions to the Inquiry
In Tranche 1 of the Inquiry we represented three Core Participants. Both Lindsey German and Richard Chessum gave live evidence to the Inquiry.
It was clear from the disclosure that the TOM was a targeted organisation subjected to political policing, but it went beyond mere attendance and note-taking by UCO’s sitting at the back of meetings as before. We argued that in the early 1970s the new strategy of the SDS involved infiltrating groups and sabotaging their activities. The infiltration of the TOM serves as a case study illustrating the modus operandi of political policing.
In 1969, the British government dispatched troops to Northern Ireland initially due to concerns about the potential violence from loyalist groups targeting working-class Catholic communities. It was argued by the British Government that this would be a short-term, temporary solution. However, the outcome turned out to be quite different. The deployment evolved into the longest continuous military campaign in British history. Despite initially being welcomed by Catholic communities, the British army eventually came to be viewed as an occupying force.
On January 30 1972, soldiers from the Parachute Regiment launched a brutal armed assault on the predominantly Catholic-nationalist Bogside area in the city of Derry. Thirteen unarmed civilians were killed in the assault (with a fourteenth dying later). It wasn't until 2010 that the Saville Inquiry report concluded that the killings were "unjustified" and "unjustifiable."
From the very beginning, the TOM became a primary target of political policing. It was subjected to infiltration by numerous undercover officers. The initial police officer to penetrate the TOM was HN298, known as 'Mike Scott.' However, Scott concluded that the organisation had no subversive intentions and did not endorse or employ violence to achieve its goals. Despite the absence of any public order justification, the targeting of the TOM persisted for decades. In fact, senior officers, civil servants, and the Home Office requested that the infiltration continue despite Scott’s conclusions. The next undercover officer would assume the new approach to infiltration, that is, not only gather information on the TOM but also attempt to assume a leadership position within the movement.
In February 1975, a new officer infiltrated the group. This officer, 'Rick Gibson' (real name Richard Clark), was assigned by his SDS superiors - likely at the behest of MI5 - to join the TOM and establish a new branch. By July 1975, Clark had become the public face of the TOM's newly formed South East London branch and presided over its inaugural public meeting. Not only did Clark establish a new branch of the TOM, but as the disclosure showed he also created targets for surveillance. Until they encountered Clark, none of the branch members had Special Branch files in their names. However, Clark meticulously reported on the personal lives of individuals like 'Mary' and Richard Chessum, who were TOM members targeted by Clark. The disclosed reports delved into various aspects of their lives, ranging from physical attributes and health issues to holiday plans and hairstyles.
As we stated in our written and oral submissions to the Inquiry, in March 1975 Clark was elected as the Secretary, the highest position, in the South East London branch of the TOM. With growing confidence, he began strongly criticising other members and even had meetings with Gerry Lawless, the leader of the movement. By September 1975, Clark skilfully positioned his way onto the Organising Committee of the TOM, a national position, and eventually secured a place on the National Secretariat. This meant that a police officer was now part of the national organising and decision-making body of the TOM's seven-person national committee. Using his newfound authority, Clark exploited his position to divide and sabotage the movement. He advocated for the removal of the TOM press officer from the secretariat and strategically positioned himself on the Press Committee, likely to control media coverage.
As the disclosure shows, by March 1976, Clark had reached the highest point within the TOM and whilst the elected National Secretary was on paternity leave, Clark became the Convenor and head of the movement. During this time, sectarian violence escalated in Northern Ireland, and the British army assumed an increasingly oppressive role. Despite the urgent need for the TOM to campaign and address external issues, Clark instead created a state of paralysis within the group. He postponed a trade union delegation that was planned to observe the situation in Northern Ireland, manipulating his position to delay it. Furthermore, he used his authority to criticise other members of the TOM. By the time Lawless returned, several members of the leadership body had resigned, with some citing a noticeable lack of conviction from the TOM's leadership.
As we concluded, Clark's deployment marked a significant shift in strategy for the SDS. UCO’s were now being assigned to infiltrate campaigning organisations for significantly long periods of time. For instance, over a span of 40 years following 1968, the SDS dispatched 35 different officers into the SWP, with a focus on the London region.
Targeting socialist organisations and trade unions.
After the Vietnam War came to a close in the mid-1970s, rather than winding down, as we argued in our submissions, the SDS underwent a significant transformation. It evolved into an expansive surveillance operation, actively monitoring socialist groups. The SDS redirected its attention from purported public order concerns and started catering to different entities, including Special Branch, MI5, and various government departments. Notably, the SWP serves as a prominent example of an organisation that was infiltrated by the SDS in its campaign against them.
Starting in 1968, the SDS deployed 35 officers to the SWP, primarily located in London. Each officer had a maximum service period of four years, suggesting that there were usually more than six officers actively engaged with the SWP at any given time. This arrangement continued for over 40 years, during which undercover officers held positions of authority at various levels within the SWP, including branches, districts, and the national level. MI5 displayed a long-standing interest in the career progression of SDS officers within the SWP and explicitly expressed its wish for a permanent undercover officer to be embedded in the SWP headquarters.
For a significant duration, undercover officers skilfully cultivated enduring bonds with SWP members, cunningly masquerading as trusted companions and even engaging in intimate relationships. They insidiously infiltrated their homes, callously breaching the trust bestowed upon them, all while exploiting these connections to gather valuable intelligence. Comprehensive reports from the SDS reveal the meticulous documentation of vast quantities of information on numerous members, encompassing intricate details about their private lives, ranging from their physical attributes and occupations to their travel arrangements and affiliations with trade unions.
The scope of the reporting and the scale of individuals subjected to surveillance is truly astonishing. A striking example of this occurred during the 1980 annual Easter Rally in Skegness, where the SDS compiled a detailed list of over 1,000 attendees from various parts of the UK. This meticulous record included the names, addresses, and in most cases, the Special Branch file numbers of each individual. Similarly, at the SWP's National Delegate Conference in 1978, a comprehensive list was created, featuring just under 300 names along with their addresses, trade union affiliations, educational institutions where SWP members were present, and corresponding file references. This report, spanning 171 pages, provided detailed analysis of administrative and financial matters.
However, it is noteworthy that despite this extensive documentation, there is a glaring absence of any information directly pertaining to public order concerns. We will return to this theme below – suffice to say that despite SDS being established to provide information to prevent public disorder, this never materialised. As we, alongside other legal colleagues argued, the primary motivation behind infiltration was never truly about maintaining public order. Instead, it was a deliberate political choice made by the British state to undermine socialist organisations engaged in political campaigning.
The annual march to the Conservative Party conference organised by the Right to Work Campaign had been a significant and highly visible demonstration since the late 1970s. The campaign, supported by the SWP and endorsed by numerous trade union branches and national executives, aimed to shed light on the issue of mass unemployment and factory closures across the UK. From the late 1970s until 1984, the SDS had two officers, known as "Colin Clarke" and "Phil Cooper," holding key positions in the Right to Work Campaign office. Interestingly, Phil Cooper was a serving Metropolitan Police officer who controlled the campaign's bank account.
In the SDS's 1980 Annual Report, they attempted to claim credit for thwarting alleged "small events" along the march route by using their ‘advanced knowledge.’ According to the report, their infiltration of the group allowed them to gather information and maintain public order. However, as we argued, internal SDS reports consistently indicated that the march itself was not considered a significant threat to public order. These reports also revealed that the SDS had no discernible impact on the occurrence of any disorder during the event.
After spending five years embedded within the SWP, Colin Clarke underwent a thorough debriefing by MI5. He admitted that although the SWP strongly opposed government policies, they did not seek to subvert state institutions. None of the individuals under surveillance posed a threat to national security. The initial assessment by Roy Creamer, a detective sergeant in the SDS, still holds true to this day: "While we were in search of information, there was simply nothing substantial to report... There were no hidden conspiracies or covert activities taking place."
And yet – the SDS kept going. Kept monitoring and hoovering up information. They were increasingly tasked by MI5 and successive Government’s continued signing the cheques!
Monitoring socialists but leaving fascists alone
During the 1970s, the National Front emerged as a neo-Nazi group that participated in parliamentary elections while also resorting to street-level violence and attacks. Their strategy involved organising demonstrations in working-class communities with a significant Black and Asian population. They wanted to divide communities and feed on those divisions. As we argued in our submissions the National Front's activities directly or indirectly contributed to a surge in racist attacks across London and the rest of Britain. Shockingly, between 1975 and 1981, a total of 51 Black and Asian individuals were killed in racially motivated murders.
Whilst the managers of the SDS were fixated on infiltrating socialist groups, they approached the National Front quite differently. This disparity in their approach meant that valuable police resources could have been better utilised to prevent and solve politically motivated crimes. Multiple community organisations, including the SWP, repeatedly urged the police to prioritise efforts against the National Front. These requests and increasingly desperate demands were ignored.
We illustrated in our submissions that in September 1978, the secretary of the Brick Lane mosque in east London released a report entitled "Blood on the Streets”. This report documented a shocking 33 racially motivated assaults on the Brick Lane community during the first four months of 1978 alone. The assaults included brutal incidents such as hammer attacks, stabbings, individuals sustaining punctured lungs, and vicious beatings that rendered victims unconscious in broad daylight. The attackers often employed bricks and sticks during these clearly racists attacks. Despite clear evidence and even confessions pointing to racial motivations behind these attacks, as we argued in our submissions to the Inquiry, the police persisted in denying any such motives. Instead, they implied that the prevailing sense of terror in local communities resulted from actions carried out by left-wing activists.
Ironically, and despite SDS officers finding themselves compelled to protect themselves against National Front assaults while operating covertly as members of the SWP – police managers chose to ignore what was staring them in the face! As a result (not surprisingly given the approach of Police managers) these occurrences were rarely acknowledged or discussed by SDS managers. Detective Inspector Angus McIntosh, one of these managers, recollected a deliberate "high-level policy decision" to abstain from infiltrating the National Front. Consequently, the MPS consciously refrained from deploying any undercover officer directly into the National Front. In fact, it was only by chance, rather than intentional planning, that a lone officer accidentally ended up infiltrating the neo-Nazi group. The Workers Revolutionary Party infiltrated by a UCO, then sent that same UCO to infiltrate the National Front!
This introduction only provides a flavour of the submissions from the PILC legal team to the UCPI. We would encourage you to read the submissions contained in this report to get a clear picture of not only what our legal arguments were, but the impact it has had on the people we represented.
The Interim Report on Tranche 1
The UCPI published its Interim Report "Undercover Policing Inquiry - Tranche 1 Interim Report" on 29th June 2023.
Two major arguments have been presented in defence of the operations conducted by the SDS by the lawyers for the MPS. First, it was claimed that the SDS provided vital and detailed information to prevent public disorder. Secondly, it was argued that the SDS supplied essential and detailed information to counteract 'subversive' activities by groups and individuals purportedly seeking to overthrow the government.
The Interim Report dismisses both of these arguments. Regarding the prevention of public disorder, the report clearly states that the deployments of the UCO’s made minimal contributions to policing public order. In fact, only a small percentage of the reports (approximately 8% between 1975 and 1978) addressed matters that could be loosely associated with public disorder. Even in those cases, the assistance provided by the SDS was negligible, as evident from the report's specific remarks on incidents such as those in Southall and Lewisham. Furthermore, the Interim Report asserts that if assistance was genuinely needed, alternative methods could have been employed. Ultimately, the report concludes that the actions taken by the SDS were unjustifiable, as the desired outcomes did not outweigh the means employed (p.96).
The Interim Report is also silent on the death of Blair Peach. This is a major omission by the Chair. Celia Stubbs, the partner of Blair Peach, bravely gave detailed evidence to the Inquiry. Yet the Report stays silent on the killing of Blair Peach, silent on the deployment of UCO’s to spy on the funeral of Blair Peach and subsequent commemoration meetings and marches.
Regarding the issue of 'subversion,' the Interim Report concludes that hardly any groups posed a genuine threat to the safety or well-being of the state, in other words, they were not subversive. The Chair of the report holds the opinion that out of the numerous infiltrated groups, only three could be considered to have met the aforementioned criteria—Provisional Sinn Fein, along with two unnamed groups that were discussed in closed hearings. Consequently, it can be inferred that NONE of the Non-State, Non-Police Core Participants fulfilled the required criteria.
During Tranche 1 Richard Chessum and Lindsey German provided live testimony in person. Both individuals were actively involved in activism and campaigning during the 1970s and were subjected to surveillance, resulting in extensive files being opened on them. Not only were those actions of the SDS completely unjustified, we are deeply concerned that Richard Chessum's case led to his blacklisting. We are disappointed that at this stage the Interim Report has stayed silent on his blacklisting specifically, and the issue of blacklisting generally – which we had raised in our submissions to the Inquiry.
On behalf of our clients, we presented arguments stating that the highest-ranking officials within the MPS, Home Office, and Security Services were fully aware of illegal and unethical practices by no later than 1975. These authorities were well aware that the justifications put forth regarding public order and subversion were non-existent. Regarding the individuals appointed to the most influential positions of responsibility, it is worth noting that the Security Services and senior officers of the Metropolitan Police were aware that undercover officers (such as Rick Clark) would engage in activities that inevitably destabilised organisations. The Interim Report stays largely silent on the taking of positions by UCO’s. This in our view is a major weakness. There can be no argument against the fact that there was a fundamental change in strategy by UCO’s – they began to take positions in the organisations, and we suspect this came from the top.
The Interim Report acknowledges that there were no justification, based on public order or subversion for the SDS to exist. However, it not only continued to exist after its initial founding, but throughout the 1970’s it expanded and thrived. The UCPI must provide an explanation as to why the methods and practices of the SDS persisted during this period, and even beyond 1982
Our clients firmly believe that the only plausible explanation is that a deliberate decision was made at the highest levels for the SDS to continue to engage in surveillance, monitoring, and infiltration of socialists, anti-racists, and social justice campaigners for political and ideological motives.
We will continue to argue that the long-term strategy of the state was political policing, aimed at blacklisting individuals and groups, and creating a comprehensive database of files. No other explanations can suffice.
Trade unionists, socialists, anti-apartheid activists, communists, anti-racists, and individuals advocating the withdrawal of troops from Ireland were extensively monitored and documented by the SDS. Officers like Rick Clark willingly exploited and manipulated people, invading their personal lives and employing sexual tactics to enhance their own credibility. They abused friendships and subverted the efforts of genuinely dedicated activists.
It is important to note that Clark's actions were not those of a renegade officer; they were sanctioned and directed from the highest echelons. All of his reports were forwarded to MI5. In a testimony provided to the Inquiry by 'Witness Z,' MI5 confirmed that the impetus to investigate these organisations often originated from the prime minister and Whitehall.
In 1976, the government authorised the continued operation of the SDS. This authorisation was approved by Robert Armstrong, later known as Baron Armstrong of Ilminster, who held the position of cabinet secretary and headed the Home Civil Service. Prior to this, between 1970 and 1975, he served as the principal private secretary to two prime ministers, Edward Heath and Harold Wilson.
Clark's involvement formed part of a larger strategy adopted by the establishment, resulting in the surveillance of approximately 900,000 individuals, initially tagged in ‘slips’ then many opened into Special Branch files. The overall strategy was financed and overseen by a collective of state institutions, ranging from MI5 to Special Branches. The Home Office and the Foreign Office were also deeply involved in this endeavour.
Specifically, the Foreign Office provided funding for the Information Research Department (IRD), a unit dedicated to anti-communist propaganda and surveillance operations. Furthermore, the Foreign Office channelled funds into a front organisation known as the Industrial Research and Information Services (IRIS), which engaged in efforts to influence trade union elections. IRIS operated under the guise of conducting industrial research while clandestinely pursuing political objectives.
The Chair of the UCPI has failed to properly engage with the reason the SDS continued. If it was not there to deal with public order, or ‘subversion’ – then what were the reasons? We say it was political policing. It was Stasi-like and it was for ideological reasons. In our concluding remarks to the Inquiry we stated, “In their defence, the British establishment claimed to be defending democracy, but it was not a defence of democracy, it was the undermining of democracy in defence of the establishment”.
Paul Heron is the Legal Director at the Public Interest Law Centre and a member of the Socialist Party.
